

LIVING WITH THE ROHINGYA PROBLEM: OPTIONS FOR BANGLADESH

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Abstract

Perhaps one of the biggest humanitarian failures till date, the Rohingya refugee crisis is becoming a glaring error of judgement from the international community, and a testament of patience, diligence and humanitarianism for Bangladesh. Bangladesh from decades has been a host to the persecuted Rohingya people. But since the mass exodus of 2017, the attempts at keeping the Rohingya people secured and ensuring their basic human needs are met, and at the same time stopping any attempts of their vulnerability leading to internal discourse or national security threat, is amounting to a bigger challenge than Bangladesh was ready for initially. Now, three years into living with the Rohingya problem, Bangladesh has to come to terms with its options and take measures at resolving the issue, even if it takes a number of small steps that result to a giant leap for the Rohingya crisis resolution.

Keywords

Rohingya crisis, resolution, options, diplomacy, economic ties, military diplomacy, energy dimension, Bay of Bengal.

INTRODUCTION

One of the grimmest, most atrocious examples of genocide and gross human rights violation, the Rohingya refugee crisis is yet to be resolved. The world has in many ways begun to move on past this issue, although major global powers are still ignoring the

conflict for their own geostrategic and geopolitical gains. The refugee crisis has begun to reach a point where the wound inflicted on the largest displaced minority group¹ is beginning to fester. Their fates still unknown, this large population of helpless people remain without any assurance in a foreign land. For Bangladesh, a country with a booming population and an economy scraping to ensure proper resource distribution, is left to cater to these people. Though acclaimed world-wide for their humanitarian measures, Bangladesh can only keep the Rohingya people for so long. While repatriation processes are still yet to be approved and agreed on by Myanmar, the refugee crisis has pushed three and now entered its fourth year. Living with the Rohingya crisis is becoming more and more of a challenge for Bangladesh. With growing tension between the local host community and the refugee community, Bangladesh is having to face internal conflicts regarding resources and employment, as well as threats from within the camps, such as gang-wars², insurgencies, as well as threats of extremism, increased issues related to human trafficking and drug trafficking, etc. With new waves of national security threats and lessening funds from interested donors, Bangladesh might have to generate more options other than just repatriation, or options that promote repatriation to resolve the refugee crisis ones and for all.

¹ Gaffar, A. (2018). Approaching The Rohingya Crisis: CALLING FOR A SECURITY GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK. *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues*, 22(01), 98–121.

² Paul, R. (2020). Gang war erupts in Rohingya refugee camps, at least eight killed, thousands flee. Retrieved October 27, 2020, from Reuters website: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bangladesh-rohingya-idUSKBN26T1Z1>

SCOPE OF THE PAPER

This paper will briefly discuss the Rohingya crisis and its current situation and broadly cover the options that Bangladesh can venture into for resolution of the conflict. The paper will talk about the relation between Bangladesh and Myanmar, the two neighbouring countries at the centre of the Rohingya refugee crisis, and thoroughly discuss the many options Bangladesh can opt for to promote the idea of repatriation.

THE ROHINGYA CRISIS: A BRIEF HISTORY

The Rohingya, an ethno-religious minority community belonging to the Rakhine state of Myanmar, known as Arakan region before, have been subjected to robust discrimination and systematic state persecution in Myanmar for decades. The Citizenship Act of 1982 and other such draconian policies have made them, since 2017, one of the largest stateless communities in the world. Due to these draconian state policies that denied them any rights and recognition of state citizens, the Rohingya people were either languished in prisonlike villages that kept them restricted to their localities, or they fled persecution, seeking refuge in neighbouring Asian countries. The Rohingya people, a race of Indo-Aryan ethnic group, majority of whom are Muslims, have been here in this Rakhine land for hundreds of years. They are not considered one of the country's 135 official ethnic groups and have been denied citizenship in Myanmar since 1982, which has effectively rendered them stateless.

According to many historians and Rohingya groups themselves, Muslims have lived in the area now known as Myanmar since as early as the 12th century. There was a substantial amount of labour migration from today's India and Bangladesh to what

became recognized as Myanmar during more than 100 years of British rule (1824-1948). According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), since the British controlled Myanmar as a province of India, such migration was considered internal³. The majority of the native population found the migration of labourers quite negative. And after independence, the government decided that the migration that took place throughout the British rule was “illegal, and it is on this basis that they refuse citizenship to the majority of Rohingya,” The Human Rights Watch mentioned in a report issued earlier in 2000. This later developed antagonistic ideals towards the Rohingya people, where the Buddhists deemed them as Bengali illegal immigrants. They rejected the idea of Rohingya people, calling it a recent invention created for political reasons. The Rohingya people, thus, with no citizenship or national identity, remained isolated and restricted in their localities, in villages cut off from the rest of the country by the military, often subjected to discrimination, brutal torture and persecution. Over the past few decades, there have been several influxes of the persecuted Rohingya people across borders to Bangladesh. However, the military crackdown of 2017 took things on a new level as thousands of Rohingya people crossed borders to Bangladesh in fear of persecution. The Myanmar government stayed silent, watching the ensuing genocide that ravaged these people.

³ Rohingya. (2020a). Retrieved October 27, 2020, from Human Rights Watch website: <https://www.hrw.org/tag/rohingya>

BANGLADESH AND THE CURRENT SITUATION WITH THE ROHINGYA CRISIS

Bangladesh, deemed as a stellar example of humanitarianism globally, has to bear the weight of thousands of Rohingya people. There is, as seen, an acute, astounding lack of effective governance, strategies and intervention from unbiased organisations globally to address this issue. This is a reality linked to a variety of factors, including Myanmar's lack of democratic culture from a nascent democratic structure, which is still overshadowed by its former military rule, as well as its lack of any effective civil society, neighbouring countries' divided and uncordial refugee policies, and the international community's lukewarm response to the resolution. Such collective failure has led to violence against this community from not just Myanmar, but developed miscommunication between them and the host community. There are also factors like extremism, human and drug trafficking, etc. endangering the broader security aspect of the Asia–Pacific region.

BANGLADESH AND MYANMAR RELATIONS

Bangladesh and Myanmar, with a shared colonial past, cultural relativity and geographical similarities, are two small states in the company of regional giants struggling to keep up with their strong neighbours. The two states have had a deteriorating diplomatic relationship since the 1980s, despite being neighbours, and whatever economic contact they have had, since the latest episode of the 2017 Rohingya crisis, has begun to spiral. Despite both the governments of the states commenting several times on improving their relations, not much has been done to do so proactively. The geopolitical role played by Bangladesh, despite its immense

significance in the sub-continent, is negligible at this point. However, Myanmar has become a key player in this regard, gaining much attention from India and China. This attention from China and Russia has world as a shield for Myanmar that has been protecting it from being answerable for the Rohingya genocide and refugees crisis. Bangladesh and Myanmar have a bilateral relationship that is somewhat considerable, but there are more than enough examples of intervention of powerful neighbouring states in their attempts at creating a better economic tie and diplomatic understanding, leading to much disruption. Another important reason is the challenge of land border management, and despite the maritime border issue between the two states having been resolved by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on 14 March 2012⁴ by international intervention, the relationship between the two states remains largely fraught. But, improving their bilateral relationship, taking a look at their diplomatic and economic ties as well as resource exchange and other trades just might be the steps that can lead to the resolution of the Rohingya crisis.

OPTIONS FOR BANGLADESH

Bangladesh, thanks to its geopolitical position and significance, has been in the attentive glance of China for a while, the utilisation of which is yet to be taken advantage of. But the use of its geopolitical importance is also a key for Bangladesh to gain closeness to Myanmar. If not anything else, Myanmar and Bangladesh can

⁴ Panday, Pranab Kumar. 2012. "Bangladesh And Myanmar Resolve Longstanding Maritime Dispute | East Asia Forum". East Asia Forum. <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/04/26/bangladesh-and-myanmar-resolve-longstanding-maritime-dispute/#:~:text=The%20longstanding%20maritime%20dispute%20between,verdict%20on%2014%20March%202012.&text=The%20judgment%20is%20final%20and,by%2021%20votes%20to%201> (Accessed October 27, 2020).

develop several other ties and contracts to nurture a better bilateral tie, which could lead to better, promising days for the Rohingya people.

1. Strengthening Economic Ties

Bangladesh and Myanmar have an age-long informal economic tie, predominantly involving the Rakhine region that is mostly carried by people living near the borders, carried out by numerous boats in the Bay. The formal economic relation however does not carry much of a strong profile. And since the 2017 refugee influx, the trade rate has only been suffering, having the refugee crisis as the reason to blame, according to several economic experts and from the business community. Bangladesh's exports to Myanmar had declined by nearly 10% to \$21.37 million in the last fiscal year due to the Rohingya crisis and in the fiscal year 2016-17, Bangladesh earned \$23.73 million from Myanmar⁵. Considering the fact that Bangladesh imports more than it exports, bilateral trade is in favour of Myanmar. In the fiscal year 2017, Bangladesh imported products worth 384.88 crore BDT but exported goods to Myanmar worth 187.78 crore BDT⁶. Such exchanges that lack balance need to be addressed and questioned. Bangladesh has quite a lofty presence in the pharmaceutical sector in the Asian market and this could create opportunities for Bangladesh, even with Myanmar. What Bangladesh needs to do before creating more economic opportunities is conduct

⁵ Ovi, Ibrahim Hossain. 2018. "Rohingya Crisis Hits Bangladesh's Exports To Myanmar". Dhaka Tribune. <https://www.dhakatribune.com/business/commerce/2018/07/12/rohingya-crisis-hits-bangladesh-s-exports-to-myanmar#:~:text=Bangladesh%20exports%20to%20Myanmar%20include,and%20sanitary%20ware%20and%20parts> (Accessed October 28, 2020).

⁶ Ovi, I. H. (2018). Rohingya crisis hits Bangladesh's exports to Myanmar. Retrieved October 28, 2020, from Dhaka Tribune website: <https://www.dhakatribune.com/business/commerce/2018/07/12/rohingya-crisis-hits-bangladesh-s-exports-to-myanmar>.

studies behind the fall in trade with Myanmar Recently it was seen that border trade between Myanmar and Bangladesh reached US\$ 3.8 million as of 1 November in the 2019-2020 fiscal year, according to a report released by the Ministry of Commerce in Myanmar⁷. Bangladesh needs to study the economic opportunities with Myanmar more to figure out better relations.

2. Deepening the Diplomatic Ties with Myanmar

There were well-established trade routes and free movement of peoples before the British era, and these routes added to the informal boundaries between them⁸, Myanmar and Bangladesh have interacted with each other for centuries. The two countries officially established diplomatic relation on March 21, 1972⁹, and over the last 40 years, bilateral relations between the two states is yet to reach its full potential the way it as planned out to be at its natal stage, despite claiming to have 'cordial' behaviour towards each other. Strangely, from Myanmar's point of view, government delegates and diplomats have not visited as often as they ought to have, particularly in the last three decades. A table in the report published by the Institute of Strategic and International Studies of Myanmar shows the number of visits to Bangladesh by delegations from Myanmar¹⁰.

⁷ "Myanmar-Bangladesh Border Trade Increases In 2019-2020 FY". 2019. Global New Light Of Myanmar. <https://www.globalnewlightofmyanmar.com/myanmar-bangladesh-border-trade-increases-in-2019-2020-fy/> (Accessed November 28, 2020).

⁸ Morshed, K. 2011. "Bangladesh–Burma relations, Challenges to Deocratization in Burma, Perspectives on multilateral and bilateral responses " International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA).

⁹ Tun, M. M. (2016). Myanmar – Bangladesh Relations: Challenges and Opportunities. Retrieved from https://www.myanmarisis.org/publication_pdf/final-version-myanmar-bangladesh-relations-mmedits-ah2-1wpFhW.pdf

¹⁰ Tun, Myint Maung. 2016. "Myanmar – Bangladesh Relations: Challenges And Opportunities". Yangon: Myanmar Institute of Strategic and International Studies.


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Number	Name/Designation of Delegation	Rank	Year
1.	U Ne Win	President	26-29 April 1974
2.	U Ne Win	President	22-24 May 1979
3.	U Ne Win	President	22 Nov. 1980
4.	Senior General Than Shwe	Chairman of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)	17-18 Dec. 2002
5.	Gen. Khin Nyunt	Prime Minister	April 2004
6.	Gen. Thura Shwe Mann	Member of SPDC	September 2005
7.	Vice Senior General MuangAye	Vice President of the State Peace and Development Council	October 2008

Table 1: Visits to Bangladesh by Myanmar Delegations (Source: Myanmar Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 2016).

The table above shows the data till 2016, and to mention, there has been yet another visit in December 2019 to have a dialogue with the Rohingya people in the camps of Cox's Bazar. But when we compare it with visits of Bangladeshi delegates, the image

is different. The table below from the Myanmar Embassy, however shows the visits to Myanmar by Bangladeshi delegations¹¹.

Number	Name/Designation of Delegation	Rank	Year
01.	Major-General Ziaur Rahman	President	20-30 July 1977
02.	His Excellency Abdus Sattar	President	23-25 Feb. 1982
03.	H. E. Ershad	President	26-28 April 1988
04.	H. E. Sheikh Hasina	Prime Minister	5-7 December 2011

Table 2: Visits to Myanmar by Bangladeshi Delegations (Source: Embassy of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Dhaka, Bangladesh).

Understanding the situation is crucial here. Lack of awareness alone can cause tension between states, and without delegations visiting the other side is a factor here. As we can see from the tables, the delegations undertaking the visits have had rare opportunities in the last decade.

Bangladesh needs to establish a better bilateral relation with Myanmar. Even though Myanmar needs to make an equal effort, the issue remains with Bangladesh as well,

¹¹ Myanmar Bangladesh Bilateral Relations. (2020). Retrieved October 27, 2020, from Embassy of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Dhaka, Bangladesh website: <https://www.myanmarembassydhaka.com/myanmar-bangladesh-bilateral-relations-2/>

where, instead of addressing its issues and grievances with Myanmar directly with its government, it goes to seek support from China to intervene on behalf of it. Bangladesh and Myanmar dialogues even get intervened by Indian. Bangladesh needs to address Myanmar directly in diplomatic 'engagement' to have a one-on-one dialogue. And both the states need to become more forthcoming towards one another.

3. Adopting Defence Diplomacy

Defence diplomacy, often interchanged with military diplomacy, is a nonviolent, 'soft' use of military forces that adapts public diplomacy through activities like military exercises, officer exchanges, cultural exchanges, combined training programmes, and ship visits, etc. to progress a state's diplomatic ties with another state, at the same time promoting its international agenda. Defence diplomacy in the last few decades have developed as a major tool in the global forum and international relations for statesmen as well as military leaders to create better relations between allies and stand up as a formidable opponent.

Bangladesh too as a good hand at defence diplomacy, a strong one with India, and a significant one with China. The defence diplomacy of Bangladesh and India has seen significant progress in the last few years, evident from the exchange of visits between leaders and the conduct of training programmes, joint exercises, and in the form of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) in 2017¹². During the Bangladeshi Prime Minister's visit to India, the MOU signed between the states

¹² HADR at Bangladesh - cyclone Mora | Indian navy. (n.d.). Retrieved September 5, 2020, from Nic.in website: <https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/hadr-bangladesh-cyclone-mora>.

covered different areas for defence cooperation, like creating a framework for defence cooperation between Dhaka's Defence Services Command and Staff College and India's Defence Services Staff College to augment cooperation in the field of strategic operational studies, and another between India's Defence College and Dhaka's National Defence College¹³.

With China, Bangladesh's defence ties go quite back. From the early 1980s, the Bangladesh Army has been equipped with Chinese tanks and ammunition. The Bangladesh Air Force flies Chinese fighter jets and the Bangladesh Navy has Chinese frigates and missile boats. In 2002, China and Bangladesh signed a "Defence Cooperation Agreement"¹⁴. To China's political-military realism, Bangladesh is an important player among South Asian states. Such a strategic alliance with Dhaka offers additional opportunities for Beijing to track Indian forces. This is clear from the frequent political interactions and strengthened military cooperation between the two countries.

Bangladesh does not have such a direct military diplomatic tie with Myanmar. But considering how close and comfortable Bangladesh is with China, a significant ally of Myanmar, perhaps it is inevitable for the two countries to consider tying a better military bond. Bangladesh and Myanmar can start joint movements against border

¹³ List of Agreements/MoUs exchanged during the State Visit of Prime Minister of Bangladesh to India (April 07-10, 2017). (n.d.). Retrieved September 5, 2020, from Gov.in website: <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/28360/List>.

¹⁴ Finnigan, C. (2019). Bangladesh-China relations have metamorphosed into a strategic partnership. Retrieved October 27, 2020, from LSE website: <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2019/06/20/bangladesh-china-relations-have-metamorphosed-into-a-strategic-partnership/>

insurgencies and exchange intelligence and information about them. There can be military exercises and correspondence of the army officials between the two countries, as well as diplomatic visits to promote mutual benefits in armament and security against terrorism and insurgency.

4. Evolving the Energy Dimension with Myanmar

The Chinese interest in Myanmar relies largely on the massive energy options Rakhine region provides it. The news of gas discoveries in Daewoo in the Bay of Bengal have garnered attention from operators in India as well, a region China already having taken out major hares in these all important petroleum and gas opportunities. China, know to being the largest importer of oil¹⁵, has 80% of its oil shipped from China through the Malacca Strait, a choke-point that can easily be used to cut out china's oil supply¹⁶. The alternative path that Rakhine provides not only cuts the trip short, but also reduces the expenses. The Shwe Project has also pulled significant limelight from the energy demands of India and China, who are competing to get exclusive rights to these energy reserves as fast as possible. Bangladesh, as regional neighbour and ally to India and China, can get itself involved in this energy security race as well. There is a strong potential for Bangladesh to not only invest but also help with the extracting them, becoming partners in such projects. It will not only create better terms with Myanmar, but also will help in securing Bangladesh's own energy needs.

¹⁵ "China Surpassed The United States As The World'S Largest Crude Oil Importer In 2017". 2018. Eia.Gov. <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37821#:~:text=China%20surpassed%20the%20United%20States%20in%20annual%20gross%20crude%20oil,other%20liquid%20fuels%20in%202013> (Accessed November 29, 2020).

¹⁶ Sinha, Tuli. 2009. "China-Myanmar Energy Engagements: Challenges And Opportunities For India". New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.

5. Opening More Options on the Bay of Bengal

The Bay of Bengal is the body of water that provides an endless array of potentials for littoral states like Bangladesh and Myanmar. About 80 percent of the foreign trade in Myanmar is done through sea-borne trade¹⁷, while for Bangladesh, it is 90%¹⁸. This only emphasizes the significance of the Bay for the two states that should tie them together in trade. The options the Bay gives does not only end in trade, but in Blue economy as well as in energy security. The Matarbari Port, a deep-sea project of Bangladesh can bring another angle of mutual benefit if connected to Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port of Myanmar.

6. Contract Farming on Myanmar Lands

A more local approach, contract farming can be a significant opportunity for Bangladesh to create a deeper relation with Myanmar on a grassroots level. Myanmar has vast cultivable lands remaining throughout its hilly regions, particularly in Rakhine. And Bangladeshi farmers are known for their innovative and expert approach towards agriculture, growing high yielding crops and adopting different scientific methods as well. Contract farming was already an option discussed after the independence, where Myanmar had offered to host Bangladeshi farmers. Such proposals were repeated in 2007, where Myanmar had offered 50,000 acres of land in Rakhine state for contract farming and, after a feasibility study, Bangladesh was supposed to sign an

¹⁷ "Myanmar Earns Over \$2.28 Billion From Export In FY 2019-20". 2019. The Financial Express. <https://thefinancialexpress.com.bd/economy/myanmar-earns-over-228-billion-from-export-in-fy-2019-20-1574838708> (Accessed November 29, 2020).

¹⁸ Hussain, M. Gulam, Pierre Failler, A. Al Karim, and M. Khurshed. 2018. "Major Opportunities Of Blue Economy Development In Bangladesh". *Journal Of The Indian Ocean Region* 14 (1): 88-91.

agreement¹⁹. The agreement came with a contract that would lease lands for cultivating paddy, maize, tea, onion, soybean, and sugarcane and about 10,000 farmers were estimated to arrive from Chittagong to find employment there. Currently, China and Thailand already have contract farming practices in Myanmar, creating opportunities for both the states in agricultural investments. Bangladesh can revive that contract, study the agreements and create another line of communication with Myanmar.

REPATRIATION, RELOCATION AND REINTEGRATION OF THE ROHINGYA PEOPLE

Now that we have spoken about the several opportunities Bangladesh can pursue with Myanmar, let us talk about the main concern that all these options would address in the future, dignified and secured repatriation of the Rohingya people and the resolution of the conflict. Three years into the Rohingya crisis and repatriation is still an uncertain factor. Since 2017, there have been two attempts at repatriation of the Rohingya people, one in November 2018 and the other on August 22 in 2020²⁰. Neither of the attempts saw success as the Myanmar authorities failed to earn the Rohingya people's trust. Despite several attempts by the UNHCR and other humanitarian international organisations, it is becoming a challenge to make the Rohingya people

¹⁹ Faruk, Muhammad Ashraf Ali. 2008. "Bangladesh-Myanmar Contract Farming: Opportunity For Bangladesh To Meet Agricultural Shortfall | Asian Tribune". Asiantribune.Com. <http://www.asiantribune.com/?q=node/13938> (Accessed November 29, 2020).

²⁰ Anik, S. S. B. (2020). Three years on, Rohingya repatriation is still uncertain. Retrieved October 27, 2020, from Dhaka Tribune website: <https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/rohingya-crisis/2020/08/24/three-years-on-rohingya-repatriation-still-uncertain>.

feel safe enough to return home. Among the demands of the Rohingya people included lifting restrictions on freedom of movement, reconfirming that the internally displaced Rohingya people can return to their own villages safely, providing them with access to human needs, such as education, occupation, health care, etc. and providing a clear statement that allow them citizenship. Myanmar has failed to address the root causes of the widespread discrimination and abuse against the Rohingya and has not considered the conditions put forth by the Rohingya people, refusing to create the necessary conditions for their safe, dignified, and voluntary return. So, repatriation talks have reached yet another stalemate again.

The talk of repatriation and reintegration of Rohingya people in Myanmar was subjected in the MoU signed between Myanmar, UNHCR and UNDP on 6 June 2018, setting out the terms on which they would cooperate²¹. On 27 May 2019 however, the June 2018 MoU was extended for a period of a year, and on 11 May 2020 it was extended again, to June 2021. The MoU between UNHCR, UNDP and Myanmar places overall responsibility for the safety, reception and reintegration of returnees on the Myanmar government. Apparently, Myanmar has been building “Reception and Transit Centres” for returnees and also identifying possible places for them to live on an ongoing basis²². But the issue remained when UNHCR had expressed dissatisfaction with the provided access.

²¹ Taylor, S. (2020). A closer look at repatriating the Rohingya. Retrieved October 28, 2020, from UNSW- Andrew and Renata Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law website:
<https://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/publication/closer-look-repatriating-rohingya>.

²² ‘Detailed findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar’, para 199.

Talks of resettlement in a third country has also been discussed. Rohingya people are also clinging to the idea of resettling to a rich third country, a decision based entirely on Bangladesh. Bangladesh on the other hand counters that it was up to the UNHCR to request the resumption of resettlement, following which Bangladesh would approve resettlement. From 2006 to 2010, the program saw 920 Rohingya resettled in countries such as Australia, Canada and the United States²³. However, resettlement is a farfetched idea of sorts, due to the reluctance of European countries and the US to take Muslim refugees and also because of resettlement decreasing globally as an option.

In such a situation, the only option for Bangladesh is to not wait for international intervention anymore, hoping for International organisations to resolve the Rohingya crisis as a plea of humanitarian crisis. Bangladesh needs to step up and be better at the game of diplomacy and economy by readdressing, re-establishing and recreating newer relations with Myanmar on several fields to leverage the repatriation talks to a more feasible condition.

CONCLUSION

At the end, the Rohingya crisis can be entirely pinned as a collateral damage of economic and geopolitical options Myanmar is being offered by China in the Rakhine state. The Rohingya crisis has always been one of the many other internal ethnic conflicts Myanmar is rattled with. Myanmar has a significantly heterogeneous population that disagrees on almost all major national decisions, and hatred towards

²³ As Other Doors Close, Some Rohingya Cling to Hope of Resettlement. (2020). Retrieved October 27, 2020, from voanews.com- Reuters website: <https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/other-doors-close-some-rohingya-cling-hope-resettlement>.



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Rohingya people is also not unanimous throughout the country. But the economic and geopolitical options in Rakhine state has triggered this hatred to a boiling point, leading to the mass exodus. Then perhaps, the solution lies in economic, diplomatic and geopolitical options as well, options which are provided from Bangladesh. Bangladesh needs to promote its own economic and diplomatic capabilities to attract attention from China and India, and target Myanmar while doing so. The options discussed above are all viable and need to be considered. Perhaps Bangladesh should opt for such attempts at rekindling relations with Myanmar and hope that it can lead to talks of repatriation and resolution of the Rohingya crisis once and for all.