Photo: Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Sean M. Castellano/U.S. Navy via Getty Images
Photo: Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Sean M. Castellano/U.S. Navy via Getty Images

A Vital Next Step for the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Command and Control Modernization

One year after the release of historic national security and defense strategies, Japan is moving with striking speed to build a more credible Self-Defense Force (SDF), capable of responding rapidly to threats in a challenging security environment. 

As Japan enters the second year of its buildup, defense spending is already up 50 percent over 2022 levels. In addition to significant investments in counterstrike capabilities, munitions stockpiles, and SDF readiness, it has announced major structural reforms to the SDF as well—in particular, plans to establish a Japan Joint Operations Command (J-JOC) by 2025 to direct all SDF joint operations. This is a significant reform, one that was long debated and long delayed, and it represents a victory for advocates of increased jointness as key to the deterrence and response capabilities of the SDF.

The speed with which Japan is moving to strengthen defense capabilities increases the importance of the next step in U.S.-Japan alliance transformation: modernizing its command-and-control architecture. As Japan becomes a more capable military partner, Washington and Tokyo need to build new structures to support a more operational alliance. A transformed command and control architecture would significantly enhance the credibility of the alliance and help to reinforce deterrence in East Asia. Japan’s planned acquisition of counterstrike capability lends particular urgency to this effort; for the first time, the United States and Japan will need to be able to coordinate the use of force, both tactically (identifying and prosecuting targets) and strategically (managing escalation in a conflict).

Reimagining U.S. Forces Japan
The current structure of alliance command and control is not sufficient for the task. U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) has changed little since the 1960s, when Japan was viewed as little more than a platform for U.S. military operations across the region. USFJ’s authorities and staffing are limited primarily to administering alliance agreements related to the 50,000-plus U.S. personnel stationed in Japan with the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Army. U.S. forces in Japan represent some of the most important U.S. military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific, but the three-star USFJ commander has limited joint operational authorities, and the separate U.S. service elements in Japan report back to their component headquarters in Hawaii.

The inadequacy of existing alliance command and control is increasingly recognized in both Washington and Tokyo. The U.S. Congress in the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act required a Defense Department feasibility study (due in June) on modifying U.S. command structures in Japan to complement Japan’s establishment of the J-JOC.

But if the need for modernization seems obvious, the specific solution to improve alliance command and control is complex and involves myriad stakeholders. To foster bilateral dialogue on the topic, the authors have been collaborating for over a year with a wide range of experts, retired military and government officials, and currently serving officials from both countries—all with long alliance experience—to consider and debate options for modernizing the architecture of the alliance. The initiative produced a mid-term report last May, and a final report is forthcoming. The views here represent the personal views of the authors, based on this work.

A U.S. Joint Force Headquarters in Japan
A central conclusion of these deliberations is the need for a forward U.S. joint operational command element in Japan to serve as the standing, day-to-day counterpart for Japan’s new J-JOC. It is up to the two governments to determine how to accomplish this vision in detail, but with the benefit of several bilateral workshops and input from many experts, the authors can offer some general recommendations.

First, to provide for the focused planning and execution of U.S.-Japan bilateral missions, the United States should transform USFJ into a fully capable three-star Joint Force Headquarters, subordinate to INDOPACOM, who can work with the J-JOC deputy commander, also a three-star, on a daily basis. Japan’s new J-JOC will be led by a 4-star officer of equivalent rank to Japan’s service chiefs, supported by a staff of about 240 personnel and located within the Defense Ministry in Tokyo. Although the J-JOC Commander’s U.S. leadership counterpart will be the commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), the command in Hawaii has vast regional responsibilities that limit its ability to focus on the day-to-day relationship with Japan. The J-JOC warrants, and the alliance would benefit from, a true U.S. joint operational counterpart located in close proximity.

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